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CANADIAN-ZAMBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ENGAGEMENTS: A CRITICAL 





Canada’s engagements with African states with regards to human rights began about five 
decades ago, and different countries in Africa have since benefited from such engagements. 
With Zambia specifically, such engagements have mainly centered along human rights 
issues. Recently, Canada has heavily invested in Zambia’s mining sector. This article 
explores Canada’s human rights engagements with Zambia.  The article first reviews the 
economic performance of Zambia since its independence and the effect that this has had on 
the country. The article then looks at Canadian engagements with Zambia in terms of health, 
women’s rights, refugees’ rights and mining. It acknowledges that while Canada is actively 
involved in the advancement of human rights in Zambia, its engagements have not been as 
visible as those engagements undertaken by its sister Global North states/entities, such as the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, and the European Union. Nevertheless, the article 
acknowledges that the existence of this apparent gap may be due to the fact that there is not 
much visible literature detailing Canada’s aid relationship with Zambia. The article will thus 
assess the gaps in the literature in this regard and chart a future research agenda/path. 
 
1.FIVE DECADES AGO, Zambia was one of the most prosperous countries in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
When it became independent in 1964, Zambia’s rich mineral resources were well 
developed and up to the early 1970s, world market conditions were generally 
favorable. During this period the pattern of government expenditure actually reflected 
the country’s steady export receipts from copper.1  
 
This, however, did not last long, and approximately 10 years after independence, the national 
economy began to suffer. In large part, Zambia’s fortunes were adversely affected by external 
shocks that arose in quick succession first in 1973, when oil prices quadrupled and then in 
1974, when copper prices dropped considerably. The country depended on copper for more 
than 90% of its export revenue, the economy experienced severe difficulties adjusting to 
these shocks.”2 The shocks established major setbacks on the economy as a whole.  
                                                          
* Lecturer at the University of Zambia Law School, and PhD Researcher at the University of Sussex 
1 United States Agency for International Development, Policy Reforms and Structural Adjustment in Zambia: 
The Case of Agriculture and Trade, by Oliver S Saasa, Technical Paper No 35 (Washington, DC: USAID, 
October 1996) at 3, online: <www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/doc4533.pdf>. 
2 Ibid. 
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By 1975, Zambia was faced with a sharp decline in government revenue and a serious 
balance of payments problem. Unsustainable budget deficits also set in. Declining ore 
reserves, inadequate foreign exchange earnings and accelerating domestic inflation 
prevented the mining companies from reinvesting in order to sustain output levels.3  
 
External shocks were exacerbated by domestic shocks that flowed from declining ore 
reserves and inadequate foreign exchange. Due to the effects that these shocks had on the 
country, Zambia borrowed heavily from other countries in order to sustain itself.  
Despite these setbacks to the economy, the government continued spending without 
taking into consideration the effect that excessive borrowing could have on the country. And 
as such: “In spite of these difficulties, public spending remained high, financed by massive 
external borrowing. By the early 1980s, the economy was under serious stress.”4  
During this period, Zambia was a one-party state. However, by 1991, multi-party 
politics were introduced, and with this came its own economic and political programs. The 
economy remained undiversified and continued to exhibit heavy dependence on mineral 
resources (particularly copper exports).  Early 1991, however, saw a lot of economic reforms 
in the country. On the advice from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the government 
that came into power then reintroduced a structural adjustment program (that had been 
previously abandoned in 1986) into the Zambian economy.  
The UNIP (United National Independence Party) was defeated in the October 1991 
elections, and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government took 
over, agreeing to continue reforms agreed upon between UNIP and the World Bank 
and IMF in 1990.5 
 
Many companies were privatized, including Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines 
(ZCCM) which was Zambia’s principal source of income since it had served as the country’s 
the main producer of copper. 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid at 3-4. 
5 UN, Zambia Human Development Report 2016: Industrialization and Human Development (Lusaka, Zambia: 
UNDP, 2016), online: <hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/zambia_human_development_report_2016.pdf>. 
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By 2000, the economy had started to recover and was showing signs of positive 
development.  In fact after 2000, Zambia began to register more encouraging macroeconomic 
trends. This progress, however, proved to be largely temporary, given that the region soon 
experienced a crippling drought in 2002: 
 Following the sale of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM) and with 
a GDP growth rate of 3.5% in 2000 and 5.2% in 2001, a brighter economic outlook 
emerged for the economy. According to Zambia’s Central Statistical Office, end-year 
inflation dropped from 30% in 2000 to 18.7% at the end of 2001. However, in 2002, a 
region-wide drought dampened the positive prospects when the rise in food prices 
sent inflation back up to 26.7%.6  
Generally speaking, Zambia’s economy has fared better since 2000 than it had during 
the 1980s. Despite the growth in the economy, however, there still has not been any real 
diversification. “The economy simply does not have a dynamic, fast-growing manufacturing 
sector to create the jobs required for a substantive and faster reduction in poverty and 
inequality levels.”7 
The challenges that Zambia has faced economically, have had a dual impact on 
human rights in Zambia as well. This article does not share the view that all human rights 
abuses have arisen from Zambia’s economic situation. However, in many ways, the lack of a 
diversified economy and the lack of adequate public spending in Zambia has diverted 
attention from most human rights concerns. In fact, at times human rights have been infringed 
through efforts to keep the country economically afloat. Therefore, while it is important to 
acknowledge that political factors may have played a role in the relative neglect of human 




                                                          
6 OECD, African Economic Outlook – Country Studies: Zambia, (2002/03) at 337, online: 
<www.oecd.org/countries/zambia/2497663.pdf>. 
7  UN, Zambia Human Development Report 2016, supra note 5. 
174 TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW                                               [VOL.4] 
 
II. COOPERATING PARTNERS 
It is during this period of economic difficulty that Zambia began relying on cooperating 
partners more to cushion its economy. Zambian diplomatic relations with Canada were 
established in 1966, two years after Zambia gained its independence. Soon after, Canada’s 
interest in the status of human rights in Zambia became manifest. This was not surprising 
since Canada’s interest in human rights and democratic governance in the Global South 
began in the late 1970s, before that of most other Global North donors. In fact, Canada was 
the first Global North donor state to assist Global South countries with their efforts to adhere 
to their human rights obligations.8  This work was done through the Canadian International 
Development Aid (CIDA), which has now merged into Global Affairs Canada.9 Canada 
spreads its aid among a diverse set of priority areas, which can be broadly characterized into 
the following five areas: good governance, health (with a focus on HIV/AIDS), basic 
education, private sector development, and environmental sustainability (with gender equality 
as a "crosscutting theme", although programming tends to focus on a subset of these areas in 
each country).10  
In December 2002, Canada placed its aid emphasis in Africa within six core countries 
— Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, and Tanzania. In the 2005 policy 
framework, which mostly centered on promoting economic and commercial engagements, 
Canada added eight new African countries to its core grouping—Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, and Zambia.  
Anchoring Canada’s aid program to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, now 
Sustainable Development goals), the new framework emphasizes five major sectors: 
promoting good governance, supporting health outcomes, strengthening basic 
                                                          
8 Katarina Tomaševski, Development Aid and Human Rights: A Study for the Danish Center of Human Rights 
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989) at 56. 
9 David J Hornsby, “Changing Perception into Reality: Canada in Africa” (2014) 69:3 Intl J: Canada’s J Global 
Pol’y Analysis. 
10 CD Howe Institute, How Canada Can Improve Its Development Aid: Lessons from Other Aid Agencies, by 
Danielle Goldfard and Stephen Tapp, No 232 (Ottawa/Toronto: Renouf Publishing, April 2006) at 1-24, online: 
<www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed//commentary_232.pdf>. 
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education, supporting private sector development, and advancing environmental 
sustainability.11  
Currently, Canada is actively engaged in development assistance in ten African countries.  
“Working to achieve its development priorities, Canada focuses its international development 
efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa in ten countries.”12 For a country like Canada, this is a small 
number of countries to be focusing on. This does not mean that it is not involved in working 
with partners in other countries in Africa but its level of engagement is quite low and narrow. 
“The value of Canadian trade and investment discloses an uncomfortable reality: its 
economic engagement is currently quite small and narrowly aligned in both international and 
Canadian terms.”13  
Canada’s narrowly aligned economic engagement in Africa can be shown in a 
memorandum of understating on the provision of Poverty Reduction Budget Support in 
Zambia. In April 2005, GRZ and four cooperating partners (the European Commission, the 
World Bank, the UK Department for International Development [DFID] and the Netherlands) 
signed a MoU on the provision of Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS). Later, 
Sweden, Norway, Germany, Finland and the African Development Bank followed suit.14 It is 
important to note that Canada has never been a leader with respect to the PRBS, but it is 
known as an active member that offers support. By comparison, lead members are those that 
are actively involved in the provision of support while the contribution from active members 
is minimal. It is important to note that Zambia is not among the African countries in which 
Canada is actively involved. 
Cooperating partners in Zambia provide budget support in both forms: general 
Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) is provided by the PRBS group of six 
bilateral donors (Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the 
                                                          
11 Jeffery Steeves, “Canadian development assistance: The value framework and the field reality of an African 
Country” (2007) 96:391 The Round Table 489. 
12 www.international.gc.ca/ss-africa-afruqye-ss/support_dev.aspx?long=eng accessed on 16th March, 2017 
13 Hornsby, supra note 9. 
14 German Development Institute, Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia: Implementation, direct effects and 
political economy, by Stefan Leiderer & Jörg Faust, (Bonn, Germany: German Development Institute, 2012) at 
59, 62, online: <edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2013/4406/pdf/Studies_68.pdf>. 
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United Kingdom), the European Commission (EC), the African Development 
Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank. Sector budget support is provided by the EC 
for roads, health and in support of the Public Expenditure Management and 
Financial Accountability (PEMFA) reform program, and by the United Kingdom 
in the health sector.15   
 
  The aim of those donors coming together was to help Zambia meet the now defunct 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). “The purpose was to contribute in a more effective 
way to the reduction of poverty and the realization of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs)”.16 Although the MDG timeline has now come to an end, the programs have 
continued under the umbrella of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  
 
III. CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ENGAGEMENTS IN (WITH?) ZAMBIA 
Canada’s global efforts to eliminate gender based violence such as child, early and forced 
marriage (CEFM) and female genital mutilation (FGM) has been praised by the international 
community.17 In particular, Canada has played an important role in bringing global attention 
and action to ending child, early, and forced marriage (CEFM). In 2013, Canada and Zambia 
co-led the first ever stand-alone resolution on CEFM at the United Nations General 
Assembly, with the resolution being adopted by a consensus of 109 co-sponsors. The 
Zambian Government, through the Ministry of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs and the Office 
of the First Lady initiated a nation-wide campaign to end child marriage in April 2013. This 
campaign was launched in Chipata, Eastern Province. Zambia has one of the highest rates of 
female child marriage in Africa, with a reported national prevalence of 42 per cent.18 It was 
as a result of these very troubling figures that the Canadian Government came on board to 
                                                          
15 Ibid at 4. 
16 The Netherlands, Synthesis Report – Between high expectations and reality: An evaluation of budget support 
in Zambia (2005-2010), by Antonie de Kemp, Jörg Faust & Stefan Leiderer, (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, November 2011) at 31, online: 
<www.oecd.org/countries/zambia/49210553.pdf>. 
17 <www.canadainternational.gc.ca/united_Kingdom-royaume_uni/eyes_abroad-coupdoeil/girl_su> 
18 United Nations Population Fund, Marrying Too Young: End Child Marriage, (New York: UNFPA, 2012) at 
23, 74, online: <www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/MarryingTooYoung.pdf>. 
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support Zambian Government efforts. The Canadian Government has also supported the 
development of Zambia’s National Strategy to End Child Marriage 2030 and the country’s 
National Plan of Action to implement the strategy.  
The Canadian Government also supported the Civil Society Network on Ending Child 
marriage through the development of a network strategic plan which was launched in May 
2016.19 This is a network of about 30 international and local NGOs who have come together 
to complement government efforts. “Even within a bilateral framework, Canadian initiatives 
on human rights are increasingly co-coordinated with those of other multilateral and bilateral 
donors. The donor community (both bilateral and multilateral) has made a concerted effort to 
improve aid effectiveness through increased co-ordination.”20 
The Canadian Government has been further instrumental in convening a Cooperating 
Partners’ group in Zambia to leverage resources and develop a shared purpose in the 
campaign. Additional support includes providing financial resources towards the hosting of 
the African Girls Summit, which was held in Zambia in 2015.21 Canada also provided 
funding to help curb child marriages. The Government of Canada announced it was providing 
UNICEF Zambia with US$1.58 million (CAN$1.7 million) in additional funding to combat 
child marriage.22 In the last three years, Canada has announced over $60 million in 
programming towards CEFM programs.  
Canadian leadership on CEFM was recognized at the event as High Commissioner 
Gordon Campbell highlighted recent successes such as the Canada-Zambia led UN 
resolution on CEFM and millions in aid to various NGOs and local initiatives. Over 
the last three years, Canada has announced over $60 million in programming to 
                                                          
19 “National Strategy on Ending Child Marriages Launched” UNFPA-Zambia (9 April 2016) at “In the News”, 
online: <zambia.unfpa.org/news/national-strategy-ending-child-marriage-launched>.  
20 David R Black, Jean-Philippe Thérien & Andrew Clark, “Moving with the Crowd: Canadian Aid to Africa” 
(1996) 51:2 Intl J 259. 
21 African Union, “Outcome Statement of the First African Girls’ Summit on Ending Child Marriage in Africa” 
African Union (November 2015) at 2, online: 
<www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/27035-wd-
outcome_statement_in_english_0.pdf>. 
22 Zambia Hosts Symposium to end Child Marriage-Unicef, online: 
<www.unicef.org/Zambia/CM_Press_Release_100715.docx> 
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address CEFM with partners including UNICEF and Canadian and international 
NGOs.23 
To support ongoing national efforts aimed at addressing child marriage in Zambia, the 
Government of the Republic of Zambia – with support from the UN Fund for Population 
Activities (UNFPA), the UN Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UKAID (through the 
Department for International Development (DFID)), the Government of Canada, and other 
partners – launched the National Strategy to End Child Marriage by 2030.24 The program was 
launched under the theme titled "Accelerating our Collective Efforts to End Child Marriage 
in Zambia", and it outlines Zambia's strategic focus to accelerate national efforts towards 
ending child marriage by 2030 through the implementation of a multi-sectoral operational 
framework that reflects current national and global trends and efforts.  
It further aims to promote and contribute to the protection of the rights of all girls and 
boys, both those affected by child marriage as well as those at risk; and support their 
development and welfare as espoused in the revised National Child Policy; the revised 
6th National Development Plan; Zambia's Vision 2030; the African Union Charter; 
and other relevant national and international policy and legal frameworks.25  
In its fight against the spread of AIDS, which is inextricably linked to the issues of 
international development, Global Affairs Canada has focused Canada’s support on the 
following goals: strengthening existing health care systems, helping vulnerable groups gain 
control over their lives and health, promoting AIDS prevention measures, and building links 
to other related health services. The funding provided includes a grant to Hope House in 
Zambia, an organization that offers counseling and support for persons with AIDS26 and 
where donors usually work hand in hand in the health sector on a rotating basis.  
Division of labor (DoL) in the health sector has been implemented through a so-
called troika arrangement under which three donors act as lead on a rotating basis. 
                                                          
23 Looking Back on a Year of Action to Fight GBV, online: <www.canadainternational .gc.ca/united _kingdom-
royaume_uni/eyes_abroad-cou>. 
24 German Development Institute, supra note 14. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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DoL has not made great advances since its inception in 2005/6 in terms of 
reducing the overall number of active donors in the sector.27  
The troika agreement with regard to the division of labor in this area shows that Canada is an 
active member of the group, but not one of its lead members. 
The maternal and child health project aims to improve maternal and child health by 
improving education with respect to safe breastfeeding practices to enable HIV-positive 
mothers to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission.28 The project focuses on strengthening 
maternal and child health systems related to HIV/AIDS; improving food security for HIV-
positive mothers; and fostering community mobilization and education. The projects include: 
promoting safe breastfeeding; developing food programs for families affected by HIV/AIDS; 
and training for 300 health workers to improve the provision of maternal and infant health 
care for families affected by HIV/AIDS.29 It targets the Lusaka district in Zambia, and 
reaches over 1,500 HIV positive women. Considering that the right to health is a basic need, 
this project is making a positive contribution to Zambia’s health system. The International 
Development and Relief Foundation is working in partnership with the University of Zambia 
to implement this project.30 This project is part of Canada's Maternal, Newborn and Child 
Health commitment.  
Another project in which Canada engaged is related to cold chain management. Cold 
chain capacity is a problem in Zambia, especially in rural areas. Cold chain management is 
essential for a country like Zambia because without it medicines would lose their potency and 
therefore would not be able to provide adequate protection against disease. The cold chain 
project is increasing cold chain capacity in Zambia by strengthening routine immunization. 
                                                          
27Stefan Leiderer, “Donor Coordination for Effective Government Policies? Implementation of the New and 
Effective Agenda in Health and Education in Zambia” (2015) 27:8 J Intl Dev 1422. 
28 Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, Project-Profile – Maternal and Child HIV/AIDS Health Care 
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Thereby, major disease killers particularly amongst children, are comatted. This project 
targets the whole country and provides support for immunization. 
Specifically, the project contributes to increasing the national cold chain capacity 
from 99,420 liters to 196,216 liters, which represents 60% of the national 
capacity. CIDA contribution with other donors enables UNICEF to reach this 
target. This initiative helps Zambia to attract additional roll out of vaccines, 
including pneumococcal and rotavirus vaccines, from the GAVI Alliance once 
the cold chain capacity is improved. With this initiative, the 20 districts hardest to 
reach and worst performing are expected to be adequately covered for child 
immunization.31 
Canada has also been actively involved in supporting the sensitization of communities 
with regards to HIV/AIDS. This project aims to promote responsible sexual and reproductive 
health lifestyles amongst 76,000 people of four provinces of Zambia. The aim of the project 
is to create awareness with regards to HIV/AIDS. The project educates and creates awareness 
in sexual and reproductive health, including education about STDs and HIV amongst boys 
and girls, men and women, in churches and communities alike.32 This project is critical for 
Zambia since there is still exists stigma surrounding the issue of HIV and people are often 
scared to get tested. Community health volunteers (CHVs) have been identified as important 
resources for Zambia’s health sector, particularly given the country’s tremendous shortage of 
resources for human health in rural and remote communities. Therefore, the project builds 
local capacity for voluntary testing and counselling services and addresses sexual and 
reproductive health needs of young men and women. Based on an initial survey, the project 
identifies strategies for key subgroups of clientele.33  
It trains 32,000 church leaders and 1000 guidance and counselling volunteers who in 
turn organize community education sessions. Education and communication materials 
on HIV/AIDS and STDs are produced, including for radio programs. An end-line 
survey and evaluation is conducted. International Needs Zambia, the local partner, 
and the Canadian public meet to exchange experience.34  
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Donor engagements have been met by some setbacks. One such setback arose when 
scandal developed involving circumstances where a substantial amount of money was stolen 
from foreign aid donors. Government corruption led many donors to pull back their aid 
commitments to Zambia.35 The resulting impact on the country as a whole, especially on the 
health sector, has been substantial.  
Although the Zambian Government has paid dearly in lost donor revenues, the human 
costs for intended beneficiaries of the assistance have been even higher. Up until 
2009, child mortality had decreased, access to drugs had improved, and immunization 
showed a positive trend. These advances stopped abruptly with the freeze in donor 
funding. According to a review of the Zambian health sector for 2010, produced by 
the health ministry, the sector experienced a “turbulent financial situation” due to the 
“dramatic and acute resource reduction”.36  
 
This was felt by a majority of the Zambians who could not afford private medical care.  
 
Canada's aid agency, the Canadian International Development Agency, lost about 
$880,000 as a result of the embezzlement, The Globe and Mail has learned. The 
Canadian aid agency spent more than $30-million on programs in Zambia last year.37 
 
Several other donors, including Sweden and the Netherlands, have also suspended aid 
donations to Zambia as a result of the corruption scandal, which came to light around 2010 
when a whistle-blower revealed that Zambian officials were stealing aid money. Auditors 
confirmed that about $7 million had been stolen, mostly from foreign donors. 
Back in Canada, confidence is also not inspired by CIDA’s piecemeal efforts to 
discipline Zambia’s health ministry: while CIDA has withheld $14.5-million in funds 
for one health program, according to the agency’s website it continues to give more 
than $17-million in aid for a number of other programs, including a fund for small 
projects, a child health programs and, ironically, improving the delivery of aid 
money.38 
 
                                                          
35 See Probe International, online: https://journal.probeinternational.org/2010/11/15/zambia-corruption-scandal-
links-back-to-canada/ (visited 21 July 2017). 
36 Ann Danaiya Usher, “Key donors to reinstate health funding to Zambia” (2015) 386:9993 Lancet 519 
<www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)61463-5.pdf>. 
37 Geoffrey York, “Canada Suspends Health Aid to Zambia” The Globe and Mail (5 November 2010), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canada-suspends-health-aid-to-zambia/article1216297/>. 
38 Brady Yauch, “Zambia corruption scandal links back to Canada” Probe International (15 November 2010), 
online: <journal.probeinternational.org/2010/11/15/zambia-corruption-scandal-links-back-to-canada/>. 
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The other human rights issue that Canada is involved in is with regards to refugees.  
“In April 2014, the Government of Zambia and UNHCR launched a three-year local 
integration strategy, scheduled to end in December 2016”.39 This integration aims to assist 
refugees based in Zambia to legal, socio-economic and peaceful coexistence.  At the moment, 
there are about 54,963 refugees in Zambia from five different countries. Canada has 
announced that will contribute US$2.7 million to support Zambia in partnership with the UN 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR), to implement a local integration program for former Angolan 
refugees. 
Canadian High Commission Head of Office in Zambia Kumar Gupta…said his 
government was pleased to be associated with the support to the local integration 
program, which will benefit and enhance the quality of life for former Angolan 
refugees, Zambian citizens settling in the new resettlement areas and the host 
community in Western and North-western Provinces of Zambia…Gupta described the 
local integration program which Zambia has embraced as a rare and exemplary 
initiative in Africa, worth supporting by various co-operating partners, as it will bring 
a permanent solution to eligible former Angolan refugees.40  
This project is not just targeted at refugees, but it is intended to also benefit Zambians living 
in those areas. A UNHCR representative in Zambia, Laura Lo Castro, described the Canadian 
engagement as a timely one as it will help kick-start implementation of the local integration 
program, which has reached a critical stage. 
In recent years, Canada has begun investing in mining industries. “Despite their small 
share of overall Canadian foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Canadian companies are 
considered among the larger investors in some African States, and the focus on the extractive 
sector gives Canada a strategic advantage.”41 Canada’s investments in Zambian mines have 
developed alongside allegations of human rights abuses. This has been so despite the fact 
                                                          
39 Solutions Alliance, Zambia National Group – Factsheet, online: 
<www.solutionsalliance.org/system/files/resources/Zambia%20FS_27-06-16.pdf>. 
40 PANA, “Zambia: Canada contributes US$2.7m to integrate former Angolan refugees” Panapress (9 April 
2014), online: <www.panapress.com/Zambia--Canada-contributes-US$2.7m-to-integrate-former-Angolan-
refugees---12-905012-101-lang2-index.html>. 
41 Hornsby, supra note 9. 
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Canada is a party to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
guidelines. 
Since 2000, Canada has maintained a National Contact Point (NCP) responsible for 
promoting multinational companies’ adherence to guidelines for responsible business 
conduct developed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).42  
Although this is the case, it seems that Canada is failing to meet some of the (human rights) 
objectives of the OECD’s foreign investment policies. 
On March 6-7, 2013, The High Commission of Canada to Zambia, in Lusaka, hosted 
a Zambia-Canada CSR (corporate social responsibility) Forum at Moba Hotel in 
Kitwe. The Forum was jointly hosted with the Chamber of Mines of Zambia and was 
attended by approximately 100 delegates…There was agreement among Zambian 
stakeholders to continue the dialogue and to develop a national policy guideline on 
CSR.43  
Although Canada has been engaged in CSR dialogue, its mining companies have lacked in 
CSR. In some instances, there have been some allegations of human rights abuses by these 
companies. 
In Zambia, Canadian-run mines have been accused of several human rights 
infringements.  
Communities affected by First Quantum Minerals’ massive Sentinel copper mine 
project in Northwest Zambia have been resisting the project for more than three years. 
The company has been throwing its weight around with the community as well as the 
Zambian government, making liberal promises of jobs and money as well as thinly-
veiled threats that opponents would not only lose their struggle to stop the mine (or at 
least reign in its most destructive aspects) but be blacklisted from jobs and contracts.44   
Human rights infringements disproportionately affect women although they are less likely to 
be employed in the mines, because women are more likely to experience inequality.  
Yet, at the same time they are more likely to lose their chance of making a living be it 
through being displaced from land, losing access to natural resources or being 
                                                          
42  “‘Canada is Back.’ But Still Far Behind” Above Ground (15 November 2016), online: 
<aboveground.ngo/canada-is-back-but-still-far-behind/>. 
43 Government of Canada, “Corporate Social Responsibility” at “The Government of Canada’s Promotional 
Engagement on Responsible Business Practice” (2013), online: Global Affairs Canada, CSR E-Bulletin No 17 
<www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-17-
rse.aspx?lang=eng>. 
44 Jamie Kneen, “Opposition Builds to First Quantum Minerals’ Copper Mine, Dams, and Land Grab in 
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removed from markets to sell their produce. The irony is that with the presence of 
mines, the cost of living in communities increases.45  
 
Although Canada is a member of the OECD and has many representatives, Canada has failed 
to ensure that Canadian investors follow the guidelines. 
“Key in this failure has been the general lack of follow up by all parties concerned, 
including the Canadian National Contact Point (“NCP”). Not only has this lack of 
continued monitoring failed to resolve the fundamental grievance, but potentially 
worse, has led to the mistaken impression that the Guidelines have been successful in 
a case where they were not.”46   
It is important to note that, although there were attempts to reconcile the parties involved and 
find a solution, these were short lived since the threats and the evictions continued. 
Since the ‘resolution’ of the first complaint, serious breaches of the OECD Guidelines 
persist. The two areas of greatest concern are, first, the continued eviction of 
subsistence farmers from informal communities located on mine-owned land; and 
second, the practice of issuing of annual land licenses to farmers located on mine land 
in a manner that perpetuates insecurity and poverty.47  
These are of great concern because the land has been used by these communities for many 
generations and therefore people are being displaced from their only known home and source 
of living.  This clearly shows a lack of due diligence demonstrated by Canadian mining 
companies with regards to human rights violations.  
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE  
Despite Canada’s position among the wealthiest countries in the world, its foreign aid has, 
since the early 1990s, lagged behind other countries that are members of the OECD.48 Canada 
has historically been recognized as a generous contributor to foreign aid. There are several 
Canadian non-governmental organizations that have disbursed millions of dollars in aid to 
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developing nations. Canada’s former foreign aid/development sector was known as CIDA 
(now Global Affairs Canada). CIDA was created in 1968 when it replaced the Canadian 
External Aid Office. Before CIDA was created, the majority of Canadian aids funds were 
transferred through The United Nations.49 CIDA was merged with the DFATD, which was 
later renamed “Global Affairs Canada.” While this is the case, it is important to note that 
there is very little information is known about Canada’s engagements in Zambia, generally. 
Information regarding Canada’s support for the prevention of early child marriages in Zambia 
has, however, been well reported. Although this has been reported in the media, is not so 
obvious to the average Zambian. Being one of the richest countries in the world, Canada’s aid 
to Africa especially in recent years does not tally with its status.  
Canada looks to be an important development partner on the continent, but the actual 
amounts of aid dispersed, lack of consistent policy, and the fact that no overarching 
assessment of the effectiveness of aid has ever taken place raises more questions than 
answers about Canadian development assistance.50  
For the most part, the literature consulted did not characterize Canada as a program funder.  
 Despite Canada’s human right engagements in Zambia, it is very difficult to find 
information about the work it is doing or what Canada’s research objectives are. In fact, its 
contributions have been invisible in most parts of the country. The article agrees with some of 
the literature that finds that Canada, as a country, does not make an effort in making known 
its contribution.  It also does not involve in a lot of research and it does not have a lot of 
people doing field work in Zambia. “While Canada maintains a number of trade 
commissioner offices across the continent which work to advance the interests of Canadian 
business, these tend to be small and must cover large geographic regions.”51 
As of September 2005, only 120 of CIDA's 1,500 full-time employees worked in the 
field, along with 173 locally engaged staff. By contrast, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom, which have the most focused aid, also have the most decentralized aid 
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agencies, with half of their work done at field offices abroad. This makes it easier for 
these agencies to assess local conditions, to ensure that programs achieve their 
objectives, and to coordinate with other donors. The United Kingdom's Department 
for International Development (DFID) has also decentralized much decision making 
authority from its headquarters to the field, while Denmark's aid agency also credits 
decentralizing responsibility for its ability to respond to changing local conditions, 
provide oversight, and coordinate with other agencies (Denmark 2004).52  
It lags behind in terms of research on the effectiveness of its engagements when compared to 
other countries that have human rights engagements in Zambia.  
Canada's aid policies stand out as less effective than those of other countries with 
which we compare them, in several ways. CIDA invests comparatively little in 
research, particularly of strategic or long-term value. The agency tends not to 
encourage debate or draw effectively on external feedback. Since the effectiveness of 
aid can depend on country-specific knowledge, other agencies have decentralized to 
the field, but most CIDA staff is at headquarters.53  
This is reflected with regards to Zambia. Very little information is known about what Canada 
is doing in the country and it seems there is no effort by Canada to make its presence known. 
 In an era where information is vital, Canada must engage in more effective means to 
ensure that its programs and engagements are visible.  
The new federal government has a choice. It can follow the Scandinavians, the 
British, and the Dutch examples by making CIDA a leading development agency. 
This would mean increasing in-house research and openness to outside researchers, 
narrowing its focus by both country and issue in a way that builds on current 
expertise, increasing its presence and decision making authority in the field, and 
eliminating tied aid.54 
Canada needs to reconsider its engagement policy in Zambia. It must also engage in more 
research and analysis to assess how its programs are working and to determine the impact of 
its engagements on the country as a whole. Without this information, it will be difficult for 
Canada and other policy makers to assess how the programs are doing.  
The UK experience contrasts strongly with that of GAC. GAC has a well-established 
and highly respected research department that makes its results readily available on its 
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website.55 The aid provided by the UK in Zambia is well-documented and there exists a great 
deal literature on it. The offices in Zambia ensure they engage experts and ensure that the 
detailed reports are readily available whenever requested.  
While CIDA's weekly e-mail messages highlight new or successful aid projects, 
DFID's messages present new development research findings that are strategic, rather 
than project-specific. On average, CIDA country reports tend to be more superficial 
than DFID reports, which pose goals, acknowledge failures of some past programs, 
explicitly consider pros and cons of alternate policy options, and realistically assess 
the challenges the agency faces in giving aid in poorly governed environments.56 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it has been shown that Canada engages in human rights programs in Zambia 
although very little is known about its engagements. One must to look through a lot of 
literature to get a sense of what Canada is doing. However, even the literature does not 
provide sufficient detail about its programming. There appears to be no or very little follow 
up on these programs to assess how they perform and there seems to be minimal effort to 
show what Canada’s developmental programs are all about. There is no evaluation or analysis 
of its programs and very little emphasis on results.  
In order to make its engagements in Zambia more effective, Canada needs to rethink 
its engagement policy. There is a need for more expert research into how its engagements are 
benefiting the people of Zambia and how it can improve upon such engagements. There is 
also a need to make greater efforts towards making Canada’s engagements with Zambia more 
transparent. Hopefully, GAC will implement this recommendation and make its presence 
better known.  
                                                          
55 Ibid at 16. 
56 Ibid. 
